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Like many other countries, South Africa has 
struggled with the growth of organised crime, and 
the mainstream narrative has often been one of 
corruptible, underequipped, under-informed law 
enforcement, unable to deal with a rising tide of 
dangerous, sophisticated, organised criminals.1 
In the mainstream media, South Africa has been 
described as a ‘haven for organised crime’ with 
veteran investigative journalist Sam Sole describing 
Czech fugitive Radovan Krejcir’s choice of South 
Africa as a refuge ‘symptomatic of the country’s 
deepening moral malaise’,2 arguing that ‘unless we 
start to exercise discipline as a society, there is a 
wave of people like him coming, attracted by our 
sophisticated banking and legal system – and our 
diminishing capacity to enforce its rules.’
Criminologists and crime researchers have differed 
in their assessments of the problem. Early post-
apartheid literature appears to accept that South 
Africa suffered from increases in transnational 
organised crime and the growing sophistication of 
local organised crime groups.3 However, whether 
the state has been overwhelmed by organised crime 
since 1994, is disputed. South Africa is far from 
being a criminalised state4 and it will be argued that 
over the last 20 years the state has taken strong 
legislative, regulatory and enforcement measures 
to combat organised crime, with mixed levels of 
success.5 This article assesses the state’s response 
to organised crime, and is limited to important direct 
state responses. 
The research for this article consisted of an analysis 
and review of secondary sources, including 
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governmental and municipal reports, as well as key 
informant interviews conducted by the Institute for 
Security Studies as part of ongoing research on 
organised crime. 
Understanding and defining 
organised crime
The conceptualisation and definition of organised 
crime is contentious. Researchers, policy makers, 
law enforcement bodies and the judiciary have all 
used a variety of terms to describe a myriad of 
criminal activities and criminal groups that could be 
considered ‘organised’ crime.6 In part, this is based 
on historical and contextual understandings of 
organised crime, related to crime control efforts in the 
United States and primarily rooted in conceptions of 
the American ‘mafia’.7 Organised crime has come to 
refer to both continued criminal activity and various 
types of criminal groups. Andre Standing argued 
over ten years ago that, ‘on a technical level there 
is no definitive reason why organised crime is not a 
catch-all term that could be applied to all businesses 
that break the law or government departments that 
commit ongoing crimes’,8 and that ‘the distinction 
between organised crime and other types of 
crime was incoherent and was based on popular 
stereotypes rather than persuasive arguments as 
to why conventional organised crime is qualitatively 
different from white-collar crime, government crimes 
and terrorist activities’.9 
Within South Africa, there are a variety of definitions 
of organised crime. The Prevention of Organised 
Crime Act of 1998 (POCA) is noticeably devoid of a 
clear definition. POCA does, however, list criminal 
activities that would be covered by the law, as well 
as offering fairly broad traits of membership to a 
criminal group. Importantly, there must be a group 
committing the crimes, and there are stipulations over 
the types of the crimes to be considered organised 
crime. The South African Police Service (SAPS) has 
relied on a variety of terms and definitions and often 
uses the South African Police Service Act 67 of 1995 
as reference.10 The Act defines organised crime as 
‘a person, group of persons or syndicate acting in 
an organised fashion or in a manner which could 
result in substantial financial gain for the person, 
group or persons or syndicate involved’11 and ‘the 
circumstances amounting to criminal conduct or an 
endeavour thereto which requires national prevention 
or investigation or crime which requires specialised 
skills in the prevention and investigation thereof’.12 
For purposes of this study organised crime has been 
taken to refer to a broad range of serious economic 
and organised crimes that could be punishable 
under POCA, including criminal activities that would 
traditionally be seen as ‘white collar crime’ as well as 
crimes perpetrated by large ‘street gangs’.13 I will use 
the term organised crime to describe the activities of 
organised criminals rather than referring to groups or 
networks.14  
Using the abovementioned conceptualisation of 
organised crime allows for a greater understanding of 
contemporary organised crime, and can incorporate 
new crimes such as cyber crime,15 which do not fit 
the typical form of organised crime.
Historical background 
Organised crime has existed in South Africa in 
various forms since the colonial period. The structural 
factors influencing the rise of organised crime can 
be traced back to this period and include the British 
system of indirect rule and cross-border trade.16 
More formalised organised crime groups were 
also recorded in the late 1800s, for example the 
‘Irish raiders’ in early mining towns17 and Umkosi 
Wezintaba, which established the ideological roots of 
some of the country’s prison gangs.18 
More recently, organised youth and defence gangs 
emerged in the 1950s, although at that time 
‘opportunities remained relatively limited and the 
criminal markets small’.19 The roots of organised 
crime as we see it today can be traced back to the 
apartheid system that criminalised and marginalised 
the majority of the population. For example, 
shebeens, which were the progenitors of more 
sophisticated crimes and criminal empires, had their 
roots in the apartheid policy of alcohol control.20 
With the majority of state funds being used for the 
developmental needs of a white minority, suburbs 
with black populations had limited funding for 
infrastructure and for policing. People often turned 
away from the state to informal sources of security, 
including criminal gangs.21 
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The apartheid government promoted organised 
crime in townships by supporting gangsters to 
limit the activities of the anti-apartheid movement 
and to promote drug use.22 Outside the townships 
the apartheid state was involved in a variety of 
organised criminal activities including, but not limited 
to, corruption,23 money laundering, smuggling and 
wildlife crime.24 Similarly, apartheid resistance also 
turned to organised crime and informal channels, 
both to fund their activities and to overcome 
procurement problems. The liberation movement 
was able to develop and exploit routes for procuring 
weapons and to gain much-needed funds through 
smuggling activities.25 After the transition to 
democracy many of these apartheid-era social and 
business links remained, and security personnel 
on both sides of the conflict were known to have 
made inroads in the private security business and in 
organised crime, using the same routes and markets 
that they had used in the past.26  
The market also had an important effect on organised 
crime. It is argued that growing demand for narcotics 
across the globe, at the same time as many African 
states were gaining independence in the 1960s and 
1970s, dramatically changed the modus operandi 
of criminal groups.27 During these years, smuggling 
and illicit trade routes were established across 
Southern African borders but also as far afield as 
India.28 The late 1980s and 1990s saw an increase 
in foreign criminal groups within the country.29 These 
transnational groups included Asian syndicates that 
were prominent in wildlife-related crimes,30 West 
African criminals, who left their home countries due 
to political instability,31 and other groups, including 
Middle Eastern, Eastern European, Italian and 
Indian/Pakistani criminals.32 Local crime groups also 
became increasingly sophisticated and were able to 
network across the globe. In the Western Cape in 
particular, functioning cartels were formed.33 
Towards the end of apartheid there was an 
identifiable surge in crime within the country, both 
organised and inter-personal. By the early 2000s 
crime reached unprecedented highs, though it has 
decreased significantly over the last 15 years. Figure 
1 illustrates the trends in serious crime since 1994.34 
Organised crime in contemporary 
South Africa
It is difficult to accurately determine the levels of 
organised crime anywhere, and South Africa is no 
exception.35 Statistics and research on organised 
crime offer contradictory accounts. For example, 
while vehicle theft, which often has an organised 
crime component,36 dropped from 88 144 incidences 
in 2004 to 58 312 in 2013,37 incidences of rhino 
poaching jumped from 22 to 1 004 in the same 
period.38 Similarly, while there was an increase in 
drug arrests,39 social research on drug use and gang 
influence seems to suggest that there has not been a 
significant change in drug use.40 The increase in drug 
arrests could indicate better enforcement rather than 
an increase in drug trafficking. Or this could be due to 
factors such as a loosening of power monopolies and 
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a decentralisation of the drug supply as new drugs 
such as tik have become popular, and that there are 
more street-level dealers41 who are easier to arrest.
In much the same way that it is difficult to determine 
whether there has been an increase in the drug trade, 
it is also difficult to determine whether there has been 
an increase in transnational organised crime. RT 
Naylor argues that, 
while it is doubtless true that there is more 
economic crime across borders today, there is 
also much more legal business, and no proof 
that the proportion of illegality is increasing faster. 
Indeed, to the extent that exchanges are becoming 
liberalised, flows more transparent, taxes cut and 
regulations relaxed, illicit traffic across borders 
is more likely to be shrinking relative to total 
economic transactions.42
While one cannot argue that transnational organised 
crime in South Africa has not increased over the last 
20 years, considering the growth in the South Africa 
economy and the increase in international trade, 
the common narrative over foreign threats seems 
unnecessarily sensationalist.43
Economically and socially, those involved with crime 
have continued to experience support through 
criminal philanthropy and a community reliance on 
the ‘criminal economy’, as described by Standing 
and Irish-Qobosheane.44 In many areas relationships 
between the police and the community are fraught, 
while organised criminals fulfil a governance role.45 
The economic power that comes through organised 
crime is not limited to urban areas. In many rural 
areas, the trade in cannabis effectively supports 
thousands of people in the production and supply 
chain.46
Of particular concern within the country have been 
the apparent links between organised crime, political 
figures and law enforcement. A prominent example 
of this was the case of former police commissioner 
Jackie Selebi who was sentenced to 15 years in 
prison for his corrupt relationship with convicted 
drug trafficker Glenn Agliotti. Similarly, Radovan 
Krejcir, the notorious Czech fugitive, was known to 
have a relationship with Joey Mabasa while he was 
head of Gauteng Crime Intelligence. Furthermore, 
entire police departments are alleged to be corrupt, 
providing a variety of services to criminals, such as 
‘losing’ dockets, and selling firearms and drugs.47
State response since the end   
of apartheid 
The South African state has taken a number of steps 
to limit organised crime since the end of apartheid. 
These can broadly be broken down into changes 
in specialised policing and in new approaches to 
combating organised crime, primarily by ‘following 
the money’ and ‘taking the profit out of crime’.48
Enforcement: the SAPS and   
specialised units  
The SAPS is the largest of the law enforcement 
bodies in South Africa. Its budget increased from 
R6 billion in 1994 to R63 billion in 2013, while the 
correctional services budget increased from R1 billion 
in 1994 to R17 billion in 2013.49 ‘Victims of crime’ 
surveys and police statistics show a decrease in 
crime over the past 20 years, yet the state readily 
admits a number of failings. Both the 15 and 20 
year reviews of state performance have highlighted 
organised crime, ineffective operation and integration, 
and corruption as serious persistent issues.50 
Although the state was arguably in a weakened 
position after the end of apartheid as a result of 
the loosening of border controls and the transition 
from a police force to a police service,51 the 
legislature and law enforcement began taking steps 
against sophisticated organised crime soon after 
it was identified as a problem.52 In 1991 the Crime 
Combating and Investigation division (CCI) of the 
SAPS was established to combat organised crime. 
By 1992 various organised crime groups had been 
identified and the police began building cases against 
them using new investigative techniques highly reliant 
on crime intelligence.53 
After 1994 the SAPS comprised around 500 
specialised units, including units such as the South 
African Narcotics and Alcohol Board (SANAB) and 
vehicle crime units. In 2001 the SAPS announced 
that the specialised units would be dissolved and 
amalgamated into the broader police service and that 
this was in accordance with government’s strategy 
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to have an ‘integrated and coordinated approach 
to fighting crime, including organised crime’.54 The 
SAPS restructuring sought to limit and streamline 
the number of units, and units were disbanded or 
amalgamated into other larger units.55 
Those arguing in favour of the disbandment of 
specialised units held that the new structure would 
be more efficient and that local police stations 
needed to be empowered by locating expert skills 
at local level. The transfer of skilled officers was 
intended to allow for a more equitable allocation of 
skills to areas that were under-resourced as a legacy 
of apartheid. It was also argued that ‘a key motivation 
underlying the restructuring is that it provided an 
opportunity for removing detectives who were under-
performing, from the specialised units’.56 Another 
motivation was that there was confusion over the 
use and responsibilities associated with the large 
number of units, and often units would avoid taking 
on investigations for fear of overlap in responsibilities 
and accountability.57 
However, as has been reported during testimony at 
the Khayelitsha Commission of Inquiry,58 the shifting 
of personnel did not have the desired effect. High-
income areas maintained higher numbers of police, 
while poorer areas often remained understaffed and 
underequipped to deal with high levels of violent 
crime. Poorly performing staff were ‘dumped’ in 
poorer areas while better performing staff were 
‘poached’.  Moreover, similar to Khayelitsha, many 
areas often have infrastructural, social and economic 
challenges that make policing more difficult than it 
would be in suburban areas.59 This has contributed to 
a breakdown in police-community relations.  
An illustration of the advantages and disadvantages 
of specialised units can be drawn from SANAB, 
which was a controversial unit until its closure in 
2004.60 On the one hand it has been argued that 
‘SANAB ...[was] regarded by foreign governments 
as the most effective drug policing institution in 
the region’.61 SANAB officers had close links with 
the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and other 
foreign bodies that provided them with training and 
skills,62 and the closure of SANAB was seen as a 
major setback.63 Its disbandment resulted in a loss 
of networks, data collection techniques, contacts, 
crime threat analysis and street-level intelligence. 
Street-level intelligence subsequently was often inept, 
and an interviewee for this article cited the key loss 
of intelligence on West African criminal networks 
as an example.64 On the other hand, it has been 
argued that, ‘under apartheid, SANAB was already 
considered to be completely corrupt’65 and that the 
high levels of corruption in SANAB were linked to the 
‘Boere mafia’ and relationships between ethnicity and 
crime.66 Furthermore, there were suggestions that 
units such as SANAB were not as efficient as they 
should have been. However, while the reasons for the 
amalgamation might have been valid, skills were lost. 
For example, the incorporation of SANAB into the 
organised crime division in 2004 meant that many of 
those redeployed were not using their skills at a local 
level.67 
In the meantime, new institutions were established 
outside the SAPS to deal with corruption and 
organised crime. This included the Specialised 
Commercial Crimes Unit (SCCU), located within 
the SAPS but with a high level of interaction with 
other institutions, such as the specialised courts, 
established in 1999 with a team of dedicated 
prosecutors.68 To put the importance of such a 
unit into context, only 15 commercial crimes were 
prosecuted in Johannesburg in 1997, but by 2007 
there were over 700 such prosecutions in Pretoria 
and Johannesburg.69 Other units, such as the Special 
Investigating Unit (SIU), were also developed through 
the Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals 
Act 74 of 1996, to investigate public administration 
corruption. 
One of the most visible specialised units established 
after 1994 was the Directorate of Special Operations 
(DSO), commonly known as the Scorpions. The 
Scorpions came into operation in January 2001 to 
investigate and prosecute serious organised crime 
and corruption in cooperation with other units. Under 
the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), the DSO 
employees selected the cases they investigated. 
Despite complaints over the manner in which the 
DSO operated, they were seen to be effective, 
with a high conviction rate.70 The successes of the 
Scorpions included limiting the terror activities of 
People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), 
taking down high-level platinum smugglers, high-
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profile drug dealers and Chinese abalone smugglers. 
The DSO was a significant player in chasing 
down sophisticated commercial crimes, including 
investigating Brett Kebble and Johannesburg 
Consolidated Investment (JCI). The DSO also 
went after political cases, and was drawn into the 
allegations of corruption around the arms deal, 
leading to the arrest and conviction of Shabir Shaik.71 
Yet the DSO also came under criticism for its tactics, 
cherry picking cases and perceived political agenda. 
Despite the recommendations of the Khampepe 
Commission (2006)72 to retain the Scorpions, the 
DSO was disbanded in 2008 and incorporated into 
the SAPS. It was replaced by the Directorate for 
Priority Crimes Investigation (DPCI), known by the 
moniker ‘the Hawks’.73
While the removal of specialised units can arguably 
be justified in context, the loss of skills impacted 
on efforts to combat serious organised crime.74 
Furthermore, the failure of the executive to appoint 
police commissioners (who arguably should be 
career policemen) worthy of the position has 
impacted on leadership within the police. The last 
two commissioners were dismissed on corruption 
charges, and the leadership of the current police 
commissioner has come under criticism, not least for 
the Marikana massacre. Divisions within the police 
have become politicised, and this has taken its toll 
on the reputation of the SAPS.75 Crime Intelligence, 
an important unit in relation to the investigation 
of organised crime, has been used on multiple 
occasions to further political ends, resulting in a 
virtual collapse of the division.76 
Changes in enforcement may have had some 
success in increasing police capacity. However, 
the demise of specialist bodies such as the 
Scorpions has had serious ramifications for the 
police’s ability to complete sophisticated organised 
crime investigations and to root out corruption in 
enforcement bodies, which is imperative in limiting 
organised crime. Despite the limitations described 
here, legislative reforms provide a strong basis for the 
state to combat organised crime, as described in the 
next section of the article.
Legislative changes 
In 1999, economics professor RT Naylor wrote, 
[O]ver the last 15 years there has been a quiet 
revolution in the theory and practice of law 
enforcement. Instead of simply closing rackets that 
generate illegal income, the central objective has 
become to attack the flow of criminal profits after 
they have been earned.77 
South Africa eagerly embraced the approach 
of attacking criminal profits, or the proceeds of 
crime. In 1992 the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 
was promulgated. De Koker argues that this law 
supplemented common law, and broadened the 
criminalisation of money laundering to include those 
who did not report suspicious transactions related 
to drug trafficking.78 The Proceeds of Crime Act 
76 of 1996 broadened the scope of the statutory 
laundering provisions to all types of offences, and 
followed international conventions that sought to 
combat organised crime by following financial flows.  
In 1998, the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 
(POCA) was passed. Strongly influenced by the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO), in the United States, POCA was a dedicated 
piece of legislation to limit organised crime and 
was touted as integral to fighting both organised 
and commercial crime.79 It is possible to use POCA 
across a broad range of criminal activities, and 
according to Mujuzi POCA is aimed ‘at dealing with 
a wide range of criminal activities, some of which are 
quite commercial in nature’. He further states that the 
Constitutional Court held that ‘the wording of POCA 
as a whole makes it clear that its ambit is not in fact 
limited to so-called “organised crime offences”’ and 
that ‘the primary object of POCA is to remove the 
incentive for criminal activity’.80
Using ‘follow the money’ and/or ‘proceeds of crime’ 
approaches and financial penalties to prosecute 
criminals is a common law enforcement tactic,81 
and POCA follows this tradition to ‘take the profit 
out of crime’. It is argued that these approaches, 
along with more global cooperation, have made it 
increasingly difficult to move money across borders 
and to launder illicit financial flows.82 POCA has been 
successfully used in a number of commercial crimes 
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as well as in more traditional gang activities. Its strong 
forfeiture laws have enabled the state to confiscate 
anything from cars and houses to multimillion rand 
businesses. 
Following proceeds of crime as an investigative 
strategy has become popular with crime 
investigators, partly because it changes the standard 
of proof required.83 Moreover, asset forfeiture also 
provides finances to continue to investigate cases, as 
a portion of the confiscated assets is used to fund the 
investigation.84 In order to strengthen the ability of the 
state to follow illicit money flows, the Asset Forfeiture 
Unit (AFU) was established in May 1999 in the Office 
of the National Director of Public Prosecutions.
In line with POCA, a number of laws and by-laws 
were passed to set stronger regulations against 
money laundering and the proceeds of crime. 
These included the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 
38 of 2001 and the Financial Intelligence Centre 
Amendment Act 11 of 2008 (FICA). The origins 
of FICA can be traced back to 1996, when the 
South African Law Commission published a Money 
Laundering Control Bill as part of a report entitled 
Money laundering and related matters.85 An analysis 
of money laundering laws by Goredema reveals that, 
after the flurry of activity in the early 2000s as the 
South African state set up legislation, regulations 
and sector-specific guidelines, by 2004 criminalising 
money laundering was substantially complete and 
institutions, primarily in the banking sector, had to 
comply with a number of prescriptions.86
South Africa has also ratified international 
conventions and joined the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF), and has strong local laws that govern 
banks and financial institutions. The South African 
Revenue Service (SARS) is a well-run institution 
and its regulatory and enforcement arm is highly 
regarded.87 South Africa also has a strict exchange 
control system that determines compliance with 
exchange control regulations; De Koker argues 
that ‘[t]his system has certainly made South Africa 
a less attractive destination for foreign criminals’.88 
Furthermore, post-9/11 concerns over terrorism 
have increased the strength of governments to follow 
money, and in South Africa this is legislated through 
the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against 
Terrorist and Related Activities Act of 2004.
While globalisation is touted as a cause of organised 
crime and transnational organised crime, one of 
South Africa’s success stories over the last 20 years 
lies in the use of ‘follow the money’ approaches, 
global cooperation and the harsh line taken on 
forfeiture laws. If one analyses the implementation of 
money laundering laws and the work of the Financial 
Intelligence Centre (FIC), it is possible to see the 
quantitative effectiveness of measures taken by the 
South African government. According to the FIC 
annual report, ‘[i]nvestment in the FIC’s work also 
yields tangible gains for public finances’. During 
2012/13, the FIC had available funds of R245,3 
million, but recovered R1,171 billion for the fiscus as 
a result of its efforts. This represents a value adding 
growth on investment of 377% for the South African 
taxpayer.89 The steady increase in the FIC’s ability to 
detect illicit financial flows is illustrated by Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Suspicious transaction reports, 2002/3–
2012/1390
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The FIC has also been able to work in tandem with 
other bodies to provide financial intelligence, and has 
been integral to a number of convictions and arrests. 
In general, South Africa’s anti-money laundering 
(AML) framework compares favourably with models 
in place in the European Union and United Kingdom. 
Furthermore, both the SAPS and prosecuting bodies 
are increasingly adept at using legislation such as 
POCA to combat crime. 
Despite this, analysts such as Naylor remain critical 
of these approaches, citing ineffectiveness and a 
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concern over civil liberties. In many proceeds of crime 
cases the onus is on the state to prove a balance 
of probability rather than beyond reasonable doubt. 
This in turn has made it easier for law enforcement 
officials to pursue cases where there is little evidence. 
Furthermore, in South Africa ‘follow the money’ 
approaches have been unable to pick up on bartering 
of goods through informal channels such as drugs for 
abalone or cattle for cannabis, which has long been 
a mainstay of the industry. It was argued by Gastrow 
that the cannabis trade underpinned the drug trade, 
as cannabis was used as a bartering system. This 
could explain how foreign drugs were purchased 
in South Africa at such a low price, despite the 
exchange rate.91 
Conclusion 
The response by the South African government to 
organised crime has been mixed. After 1994 the 
state was faced with an increase in organised crime 
that mirrored the experience of many post-transition 
societies.92 At the same time, the new government 
needed to manage the integration of the security 
forces and deal with a variety of other dysfunctions 
caused by the legacy of apartheid. This task was 
made more difficult by globalisation, liberalisation 
and the weakening of border controls. Since 
then the state has implemented strong measures 
against organised crime, including following 
many of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
recommendations93 with regard to money laundering. 
However, a number of serious challenges remain. 
Research suggests that communities are increasingly 
turning to informal sources of authority, including 
organised criminals, suggesting a breakdown in 
relations between the police and community.94 
Failure to stem this tide is likely to result in the growth 
of organised crime in these communities and the 
development of youth gangs into more organised 
structures. Similarly, corruption in the police force 
remains high and the state has been unable to find an 
effective means to limit it. Police have been accused, 
and convicted, of a variety of organised crime 
activities.95 Without police corruption, organised 
crime is unlikely to succeed and it is argued that 
‘the SAPS actively undermined its corruption control 
mechanisms’96 through, inter alia, disbanding the 
Scorpions and the former anti-corruption agency of 
the SAPS.97 
Over the past 20 years the South African state has 
put in place measures that could significantly limit 
organised crime. The legislation remains strong and 
it is continually updated. Although popular narrative 
of South Africa as a state being overrun by organised 
criminals seems exaggerated, the failings of the 
state include the removal of successful operations, 
institutions and systems, and failures at the upper 
echelons of police management. The inability to 
systematically address these failings will lead to the 
continued existence of, and increases in, organised 
crime in South Africa. 
To comment on this article visit 
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